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Privacy Revisited: GPS Tracking
as Search and Seizure
Bennett L. Gershman
The seminal decision in Katz v. United States1 changed the
way we look at the Fourth Amendment. Prior to Katz, a
Fourth Amendment search typically required an intrusion by
government into a “protected area.”2 But as Katz famously
declared, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”3
Nevertheless, the “place” where the privacy is sought—in Katz,
a telephone booth—remains a critical reference in determining
the constitutional protection that people are afforded. That
Katz may have relied on the privacy of the telephone booth to
place his call, according to the majority, was constitutionally
significant, but it proved to be an uncertain gauge of protected
privacy from governmental intrusions into other places. The
concurring opinion by Justice John Harlan more explicitly
addressed the extent to which a person‟s reliance on the
privacy of the “place” affords constitutional protection: “first . . .
a person [must] have exhibited an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second . . . the expectation [must] be
one that society is prepared to recognize as „reasonable.‟”4
Post-Katz Supreme Court decisions—and there are many—
have tried to clarify the second part of Justice Harlan‟s
formulation: the reasonableness of a subjective expectation of
privacy.5 Expectations of privacy that the Supreme Court has


Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law.
1. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2. Id. at 351 n.9 (“It is true that this Court has occasionally described its
conclusions in terms of „constitutionally protected areas,‟ but we have never
suggested that this concept can serve as a talismanic solution to every Fourth
Amendment problem.”) (internal citations omitted).
3. Id. at 351. The Court explicitly overruled Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928), which had held that electronic surveillance, without any
trespass to property and without any seizure of tangible objects, fell outside
the purview of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 352-53.
4. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
5. The Court has often used the terms “reasonable,” “justifiable,” and
“legitimate” interchangeably to characterize the objective part of the Katz
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considered to be reasonable include conversations believed by
all of the parties to be confidential,6 non-commercial activities
in the home,7 external manipulation of luggage,8 the interior of
the home from tracking by a beeper,9 and the interior of the
home from heat-revealing technology.10
By contrast,
expectations of privacy that the Supreme Court has considered
to be unreasonable include garbage placed on the curb for
collection,11 open fields with “no trespassing” signs,12 out-ofdoor activities within one‟s home13 and the workplace,14 the
routes traveled by an automobile,15 telephone numbers dialed,16
conversations with a false friend,17 commercial activities in the
home,18 drugs that are accessible to a canine‟s scent,19 and
drugs that can be identified by scientific tests.20
As the above examples suggest, the Supreme Court‟s
attempt to distinguish between expectations of privacy that are
reasonable and those that are not reasonable has been at best
uncertain, and subject to criticism.21 Much of the uncertainty
test. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177-78 (1984)
(“legitimate” and “reasonable”); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749,
752 (1971) (“justifiable”); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353, 361 (“justifiable” and
“reasonable”).
6. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
7. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
8. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000).
9. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
10. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
11. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
12. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
13. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986).
14. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
15. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
16. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
17. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
18. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206 (1966).
19. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983).
20. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
21. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, “Can You Hear Me Now?”:
Expectations of Privacy, False Friends, and the Perils of Speaking Under the
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 39 IND. L. REV. 253, 295
(2006) (criticizing the Supreme Court‟s “muddled view of privacy”); Peter P.
Swire, Katz is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 923-31 (2004)
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and criticism is attributable to several factors: the nature and
extent of the methods used by government to intrude into
private places; the varying nature and extent of privacy
interests over a broad range of places and activities; and most
importantly, the role that modern technology plays in enabling
the government to intrude into places and activities that
previously were inaccessible.22 Indeed, the threat to individual
privacy from the “fantastic advances in the field of electronic
communication” that Chief Justice Warren warned about
nearly fifty years ago23 seems almost benign compared to
advances in satellite and radar surveillance technology that
allow the government to secretly spy, track, and record private
conduct on an unprecedented scale.24
Given this uncertainty, it should not be surprising that the
Supreme Court‟s Katz expectation-of-privacy jurisprudence has
encouraged state courts to reject what is considered a confusing
and restrictive interpretation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment, and to provide broader protection to their citizens
under their own state constitutions.25
Among the most
prominent advocates of aggressively using state constitutions
to expand individual rights has been the New York State Court
of Appeals.26 Thus, in examining the Supreme Court‟s Katz-

(discussing the inadequacy of the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test).
22. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (“It would be
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”).
23. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 441 (1963) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring in the result).
24. See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 36 n.3 (describing radar-based ability to
enable law enforcement to see individuals through walls); Renée McDonald
Hutchins, Tied Up in Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment,
55 UCLA L. REV. 409, 414-21 (2007) (providing extensive discussion of origin,
science, and uses of GPS technology); Ian James Samuel, Note, Warrantless
Location Tracking, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 1327 (2008) (discussing the
technological capacity of GPA to track down persons who use cell phones to
within a range of a few meters anywhere on the globe).
25. See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State
Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1141 (1985); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection
of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
26. See Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century:
Common Law Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1
(1995).
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expectation-of-privacy decisions,27 as well as other search and
seizure decisions,28 the New York Court of Appeals has
concluded that the Supreme Court‟s interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment offers insufficient protection for New York
citizens, and has invoked the State Constitution‟s search and
seizure provision of Article I, Section 12 to afford greater
protection.29
Last term, the New York State Court of Appeals once
27. See, e.g., People v. Keta, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992) (search of
vehicle dismantling business); People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992)
(search of open fields); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990) (canine
sniff); People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61 (N.Y. 1989) (search of passenger
compartment of vehicle); People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 501 N.E.2d 556 (N.Y.
1986) (probable cause for search warrant authorizing seizure of obscene
materials); People v. Gokey, 457 N.E.2d 723 (N.Y. 1983) (warrantless search
of bag in defendant‟s possession).
28. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting the
“plain feel” exception to warrant requirement); People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d
1051 (N.Y. 1991) (statements were fruit of unlawful entry); People v. Vilardi,
555 N.E.2d 915 (N.Y. 1990) (standard for non-disclosure of exculpatory
evidence); People v. Griminger, 524 N.E.2d 409 (N.Y. 1988) (rejecting the
totality of circumstances test for reliability of informant statements); People
v. Millan, 508 N.E.2d 903 (N.Y. 1987) (allowing standing for constructive
possession); People v. Stith, 506 N.E.2d 911 (N.Y. 1987) (restricting the
inevitable discovery rule); People v. Class, 494 N.E.2d 444 (N.Y. 1986) (search
of vehicle for VIN number); People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985)
(rejecting the good faith exception to exclusionary rule); People v. Johnson,
488 N.E.2d 439 (N.Y. 1985) (reliability of informant‟s statements); People v.
Belton, 432 N.E.2d 745 (N.Y. 1982) (automobile search incident to arrest).
29. N.Y. CONST., art. I, § 12 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
The right of the people to be secure against unreasonable
interception of telephone and telegraph communications
shall not be violated, and ex parte orders or warrants shall
issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reasonable
ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus
obtained, and identifying the particular means of
communication, and particularly describing the person or
persons whose communications are to be intercepted and
the purpose thereof.
Id.
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again invoked the State Constitution in a search and seizure
case that examined a massive and prolonged use by law
enforcement agents of Global Positioning System (“GPS”)
surveillance technology to monitor a motorist‟s travels. In
People v. Weaver, the Court of Appeals held that the
surreptitious attachment by law enforcement agents of a GPS
tracking device to the underside of the defendant‟s vehicle and
the continuous monitoring of his movements for sixty-five
consecutive days constituted a “search” under the New York
State Constitution that required a warrant.30 The Court of
Appeals split 4-3 in this decision. The majority and dissenting
opinions gave carefully reasoned arguments on the difficult,
and indeed “momentous,”31 privacy issue presented—the
impact of sophisticated and highly intrusive surveillance
technology on society‟s subjective and objectively reasonable
expectations of so-called “locational privacy,”32 and the ability
of law enforcement to employ powerful new technology to
investigate crime without being subjected to constitutional
constraints.
Part I of this Article discusses the facts in People v.
Weaver, the majority and dissenting opinions in the Appellate
Division, Third Department decision, and the majority and
dissenting opinions in the Court of Appeals decision. Part II
addresses the question that has yet to be decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court—whether GPS tracking of a vehicle by law
enforcement constitutes a search under the Fourth
Amendment. Part III addresses the separate question that the
Court of Appeals did not address in Weaver—whether the
surreptitious attachment of a GPS device to a vehicle
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The
Article concludes that law enforcement‟s use of a GPS device to
track the movements of a vehicle continuously for an extended
30. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009).
31. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
32. See Adam Cohen, A Casualty of the Technology Revolution:
“Locational Privacy”, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2009, at A28. See also Dorothy J.
Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295 (2004);
McDonald Hutchins, supra note 24; April A. Otterberg, Note, GPS Tracking
Technology: The Case for Revisiting Knotts and Shifting the Supreme Court’s
Theory of the Public Space Under the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 661
(2005); Samuel, supra note 24.
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period of time is a serious intrusion into a motorist‟s reasonable
expectation of privacy that constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, although the issue is
somewhat murkier, the attachment of the GPS device to a
vehicle may also constitute a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.
I. People v. Weaver
A. Factual Setting
On December 21, 2005, between 1:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m.,
Investigator Peter Minehan, assigned to the “electronic and
physical surveillance” unit of the New York State Police,
crawled under a Dodge van belonging to Scott Weaver that was
parked on the street outside Weaver‟s home, and attached a
magnetized, battery-operated GPS tracking device to the metal
frame of the van‟s bumper.33 The tracking device remained in
place for sixty-five days, continuously monitoring the position
and speed of the van and its location.34 This non-stop
surveillance was conducted without a warrant.35 Evidence
from the GPS device was admitted at trial to establish
Weaver‟s guilt in the burglary of a K-Mart department store.36
The GPS tracking device that was attached to Weaver‟s
van is known as “Q-ball,” and is one of many GPS brands that
operate from several of the current twenty-nine GPS satellites
in orbit.37 The Q-ball receiver is able to calculate a vehicle‟s
latitude, longitude, and altitude by listening to and processing
location information.38 The device tracks, records, and reports
every movement and every location of the vehicle, and gives
readings every minute while the vehicle is in motion or is
stationary.39 As Investigator Minehan testified, an investigator
33. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1195.
34. Id. at 1195-96.
35. Id. at 1196.
36. Id.
37. Id. See McDonald Hutchins, supra note 24, at 414-21, for an
extensive discussion of the history, science, and functions of GPS technology.
38. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
39. Id.
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using a GPS tracking device could log on to his computer at
home while watching a football game and track a vehicle in
real time.40
To download the location information, the
investigator would drive past the vehicle and simply press a
button on a corresponding GPS receiver unit, causing the
tracking history to be received and saved by a computer in the
investigator‟s vehicle.41 The Q-ball used to monitor Weaver
tracked, recorded, and reported his van‟s movements and
locations every hour of every day over the course of sixty-five
days.42
Following an investigation, Weaver and another man, John
Chiera, were charged with two separate burglaries—one
committed in July 2005, at the Latham Meat Market, and the
other at the Latham K-Mart on Christmas Eve of the same
year.43 Weaver and Chiera were tried separately.44 Evidence
from the GPS tracking device was admitted at Weaver‟s trial
and showed that on December 24, 2005, at 7:26 p.m., Weaver‟s
van drove through the K-mart parking lot at a speed of six
miles per hour and left the parking lot two minutes later.45
This proof was introduced by the prosecution to corroborate the
testimony of Amber Roche, who had stated that on the date of
the K-Mart burglary, she had driven through the K-Mart
parking lot with Weaver and John Chiera while the two men
looked for the best place to break into the store.46 Roche
testified that later that night, Weaver and Chiera left Roche‟s
apartment wearing dark clothing, and that when they
returned, Chiera‟s hand was bleeding.47
Other evidence
showed that during the burglary, a glass jewelry case was
smashed and stained with blood that contained DNA matching
40. Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 4 n.1, People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d
1195 (N.Y. 2009) (No. 2009-0053), 2008 WL 6002281.
41. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
42. Id. at 1195-96. The Court of Appeals noted that the record is unclear
as to why Weaver was placed under electronic surveillance. Id. at 1196.
43. Id.
44. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 40, at 6. Chiera and the
prosecution initially agreed to a plea bargain. However, the county court
judge refused to accept the plea because Chiera would not agree to testify
against Weaver. Id. at 8.
45. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196.
46. Id.
47. Id.

934

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

Chiera‟s.48
A witness for K-Mart testified for the prosecution that the
store closed on Christmas Eve at 9:00 p.m. and that after being
alerted later that night by store managers, he returned to the
store to find police and canine units going through the store.49
Burglars apparently had cut through a metal fence leading to
the garden shop, broke open the garden shop door, entered the
store, broke open four jewelry cases, and left their blood on the
glass.50 A garbage bag full of jewelry and bolt cutters was
discovered on the floor.51 During summation, the prosecution
reminded the jury that the GPS data showed “where Mr.
Weaver went on Christmas Eve,” driving randomly from place
to place without stopping anywhere, unlike what “reasonable
people” would do on Christmas Eve.52 The prosecutor argued
that, from the GPS data, “there is proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that this defendant, Scott Weaver, was waiting outside,
making John Scott Chiera go in and leave his blood at the
scene of the K-Mart.”53 The jury found Weaver guilty of
Burglary in the Third Degree and Attempted Grand Larceny in
the Second Degree, and the court sentenced him to concurrent
terms of two and one-third to seven years on each of the two
convictions.54
B. Appellate Division
On appeal to the Appellate Division, Third Department,
Weaver argued, among other claims, that the warrantless
attachment of the GPS device to his van violated his rights
under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well
as his rights under Article I, Section 12 of the New York State
Constitution.55 The court, with one justice dissenting, rejected

48. Id.
49. Brief for Defendant-Appellant, supra note 40, at 10.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 24.
53. Id.
54. See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196; Brief for Defendant-Appellant,
supra note 40, at 24.
55. People v. Weaver, 860 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224 (App. Div. 2008).
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the argument. According to the majority opinion by Justice
Robert S. Rose, a person has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the publicly accessible exterior of his or her vehicle
or in the undercarriage of the vehicle.56 Moreover, the court
observed, it is unreasonable for a motorist to expect privacy as
to the route and movement of his or her vehicle on public
streets.57 Police, said the court, are allowed to use “science and
technology to enhance or augment their ability to surveil that
which is already public.”58 Constant visual surveillance of
Weaver‟s van in public view, the court concluded, would have
been just as intrusive as using the GPS device to monitor his
movements, and no warrant would have been required to do so,
under either the U.S. Constitution or the New York State
Constitution.59
Justice Leslie E. Stein dissented.60 She believed that the
constant surveillance of Weaver‟s van by use of a GPS device
“has far-reaching implications and has never been addressed
by any appellate court of this state.”61 A GPS device, Justice
Stein observed, enables the government “to acquire an
enormous amount of personal information about the citizen.”62
Grounding her opinion in the protections of the New York State
Constitution rather than the U.S. Constitution, Justice Stein
argued that while a person may not enjoy a reasonable
expectation of privacy in a public place from police surveillance
at any given moment, “they do have a reasonable expectation
that their every move will not be continuously and indefinitely
monitored by a technical device without their knowledge,
except where a warrant has been issued based on probable

56. Id. at 225.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 227 (Stein, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Stein, J., dissenting). Several lower courts in New York,
however, have addressed the issue. See, e.g., People v. Gant, 802 N.Y.S.2d
839 (Westchester Co. Ct. 2005) (in absence of exigent circumstances, warrant
was required to attach GPS to car); People v. Lacey, 787 N.Y.S.2d 680
(Nassau Co. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 887 N.Y.S.2d 158 (App. Div. 2009) (use of GPS
did not violate Fourth Amendment).
62. Weaver, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 228 (Stein, J., dissenting) (quoting State v.
Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (en banc)).
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cause.”63 Justice Stein granted Weaver leave to appeal to the
Court of Appeals.64
C.

Court of Appeals: Majority Opinion of Chief Judge
Lippman

The Court of Appeals reversed in a 4-3 decision.65 The
majority opinion, written by Chief Judge Jonathan Lippman,
and joined by Judges Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick, Eugene F.
Pigott, Jr., and Theodore T. Jones, viewed the GPS tracking
device as “an enormous unsupervised intrusion by the police
agencies of government upon personal privacy.”66
This
intrusion, the majority said, recalled the government‟s
unsupervised use of wiretapping eighty-one years earlier,
which had provoked Justice Louis Brandeis‟s famous dissent in
Olmstead v. United States67 where he condemned the
government for its lawless behavior and included the
memorable language that a person has “the right to be let
alone—the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men.”68 Describing the GPS device as “this
dragnet use of the technology at the sole discretion of law
enforcement authorities to pry into the details of people‟s daily
lives,”69 the majority asserted that the government had
engaged in lawless behavior and that judicial intervention was
required.70
The majority began its analysis by focusing on one of the
Supreme Court‟s post-Katz decisions that had examined
whether law enforcement‟s use of an electronic device to
monitor the route of a motorist constituted a search under the
63. Id. (Stein, J., dissenting).
64. See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1197.
65. Id. at 1213.
66. Id. at 1202.
67. 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
69. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1203.
70. See id. at 1201 (stating that the government‟s conduct involved a
“massive invasion of privacy . . . inconsistent with even the slightest
reasonable expectation of privacy”). See also id. at 1203 (“Without judicial
oversight, the use of these powerful devices presents a significant and, to our
minds, unacceptable risk of abuse.”).
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Fourth Amendment.
In United States v. Knotts, law
enforcement agents placed a beeper in a five-gallon drum of
chloroform and tracked the movement of a vehicle in which the
container was transported by using both visual surveillance
and by monitoring the signals from the beeper.71 The Supreme
Court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred: “A
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in his [or her] movements
from one place to another.”72 This is so, the Supreme Court
explained, because any member of the public “who wanted to
look” could observe the route taken by the vehicle, the stops it
made, and its ultimate destination, and therefore any claim to
privacy that the motorist may have subjectively expected would
be unreasonable.73 Indeed, the Supreme Court observed,
“[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded
them in this case.”74
The majority in Weaver conceded that Knotts appeared to
be a formidable precedent that would seem to allow police
investigators to use virtually any type of surveillance
technology to track the progress of a vehicle on public roads.75
However, as the majority pointed out, there are significant
differences between the “very primitive tracking device” in
Knotts, and the “vastly different and exponentially more
sophisticated and powerful technology” of a GPS device.76 The
beeper in Knotts, the majority noted, was used for a limited and
discrete purpose—to learn the destination of a particular

71. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278 (1983) (pursuing agents
followed the car but lost visual contact when the driver made evasive
maneuvers and the agents lost the beeper signal; but the agents retrieved the
signal with assistance from a monitoring device located in a helicopter).
72. Id. at 281.
73. Id. at 281-82.
74. Id. at 282.
75. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1198-99 (“At first blush, it would appear that
Knotts does not bode well for Mr. Weaver, for in his case, as in Knotts, the
surveillance technology was utilized for the purpose of tracking the progress
of a vehicle over what may be safely supposed to have been predominantly
public roads.”).
76. Id.
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item.77 The beeper merely served to enhance the sensory
faculties of the police to enable them to follow the vehicle
closely and maintain actual visual contact, which the Supreme
Court compared to the agent‟s use of a searchlight, marine
glass, or field glass.78 According to the Weaver majority, the
GPS device is quantitatively and qualitatively different. GPS
has a “remarkably precise tracking capability,”79 and can be
cheaply and easily deployed to track a car “with uncanny
accuracy to virtually any interior or exterior location, at any
time and regardless of atmospheric conditions.”80
Such
“constant” and “relentless” surveillance, according to the
majority, is much more intrusive than “a mere enhancement of
human sensory capacity.”81 Indeed, such tracking, the majority
observed, “facilitates a new technological perception of the
world in which the situation of any object may be followed and
exhaustively recorded over, in most cases, a practically
unlimited period.”82 For law enforcement to “see” and “capture”
such information, the majority added, “would require, at a
minimum, millions of additional police officers and cameras on
every street lamp.”83
The implications to personal privacy of using a GPS device,
the majority further argued, are staggering. They offered this
stark portrayal: “[t]he whole of a person‟s progress through the
world, into both public and private spatial spheres, can be
charted and recorded over lengthy periods.”84 According to the
majority, the police would be able to retrieve data that could
instantaneously describe with “breathtaking quality and
quantity . . . a highly detailed profile” of where we go, and in
effect, who we are.85 Illustrative of the kinds of information
77. The government agents had placed a beeper in a five-gallon drum of
chloroform and followed the container‟s movements, both by visual
surveillance and with a monitor that received signals from the beeper, as it
was transported in a vehicle to Knott‟s cabin. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
78. Id. at 283.
79. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 1199-1200.
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that this technology potentially could reveal and record, the
majority noted, are “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic
surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the
strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour
motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church,
the gay bar and on and on.”86 The majority suggested that by
using this technology, and by drawing easy inferences, the
government would be able to assemble patterns of a person‟s
professional and personal activities and could learn, with
remarkable precision, his or her political, religious, amicable,
and amorous associations.87
In discussing whether Knotts should be the controlling
doctrine on whether the use of a GPS device involves a
constitutional search, the majority observed that the use of
GPS “forces the issue.”88 Notwithstanding that round-the-clock
GPS surveillance may be extremely popular and have many
useful applications,89 as the majority acknowledged, this
widespread use should not be taken as a “massive,
undifferentiated concession of personal privacy to agents of the
state.”90 Where there has been no voluntary utilization of this
tracking technology, and when the GPS is surreptitiously
installed by the police, there “exists no basis to find an
expectation of privacy so diminished as to render constitutional
concerns de minimis.”91 Moreover, the majority observed, the
Supreme Court in Knotts acknowledged that the Fourth

[I]t will be possible to tell from the technology with ever
increasing precision who we are and are not with, when we
are and are not with them, and what we do and do not carry
on our persons—to mention just a few of the highly feasible
empirical configurations.
Id. at 1200.
86. Id. at 1199.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1200.
89. But see People v. Sullivan, 53 P.3d 1181 (Colo. App. 2002) (husband
convicted of harassment for use of GPS for stalking); John Schwartz, This
Car Can Talk. What It Says May Cause Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2003,
at C1 (noting some concerns about the potential for overzealous use of GPS
tracking systems in automobiles by law enforcement and others).
90. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1200.
91. Id.
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Amendment issue would be more directly presented if “twentyfour hour surveillance of any citizen of this country [were]
possible, without judicial knowledge or supervision.”92
The Weaver majority conceded that the expectation of
privacy in a car upon a public thoroughfare is diminished.93
Nevertheless, according to the majority, “a ride in a motor
vehicle does not so completely deprive its occupants of any
reasonable expectation of privacy.”94 According to the majority,
a motorist operating on public roads retains a “residual privacy
expectation” which, “while perhaps small, was at least
adequate to support his claim of a violation of his constitutional
right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures.”95 This
is particularly so, the majority argued, given the “massive
invasion of privacy entailed by the prolonged use of the GPS
device [which] was inconsistent with even the slightest
reasonable expectation of privacy.”96
Observing that neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the
vast majority of federal circuit courts had yet addressed the
question of whether the use of GPS in criminal investigations
constitutes a “search” under the Fourth Amendment,97 the
majority chose to ground its decision in the New York State
Constitution‟s Article I, Section 12—the state analogue to the
Fourth Amendment—rather than in the Fourth Amendment
itself.98 The majority noted that it had on numerous occasions
interpreted the State Constitution‟s search and seizure
provision to afford greater protection to New York State
citizens than the protections afforded under the Fourth
Amendment.99 Indeed, according to the majority, invoking the
92. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 283 (1983)).
93. Id.
94. Id. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (“An individual
operating or traveling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable
expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject
to government regulation.”).
95. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1201.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1202.
98. Id. (“In light of the unsettled state of federal law on the issue, we
premise our ruling on our State Constitution alone.”).
99. Id. The majority cited as “persuasive” the conclusions of two other
state courts that held the warrantless use of a tracking device a violation
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State Constitution is appropriate in order to prevent “the
consequent marginalization of the State Constitution and
judiciary in matters crucial to safeguarding the privacy of our
citizens.”100
D. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Smith
Judge Robert S. Smith dissented, joined by Judges Victoria
A. Graffeo and Susan P. Read. Smith‟s dissenting opinion
criticized as “illogical” and “doomed to fail” the majority‟s
attempt to find in the State Constitution a distinction between
ordinary means of observation and more efficient high-tech
means.101 According to Judge Smith, the defendant assumed
the risk that when he traveled in public places in his car he
could be followed, photographed, filmed, and recorded on
videotape wherever he went, “from the psychiatrist‟s office to
the gay bar.”102 “One who travels on the public streets to such
destinations,” his dissenting opinion argued, “takes the chance
that he or she will be observed.”103 Referring to Knotts, Smith‟s
dissent said that the U.S. Supreme Court drew the “obvious”
conclusion that “a person‟s movements on public thoroughfares
are not subject to any reasonable expectation of privacy.”104
under their state constitutions. See id. at 1203 (referring to State v. Jackson,
76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (absent a warrant, “citizens of this
State have a right to be free from the type of governmental intrusion that
occurs when a GPS device is attached to a citizen‟s vehicle”); State v.
Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988) (absent a warrant, government‟s
use of a radio transmitter to monitor the location of defendant‟s car was
“nothing short of a staggering limitation upon personal freedom”)).
100. Id. at 1202. See cases cited supra notes 27-28 (search and seizure
decisions of the New York Court of Appeals invoking the State Constitution).
101. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting).
102. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). The Smith dissent noted that:
It is beyond any question that the police could, without a
warrant and without any basis other than a hunch that
defendant was up to no good, have assigned an officer, or a
team of officers, to follow him everywhere he went, so long
as he remained in public places.
Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
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Judge Smith criticized the majority for imposing a “totally
unjustified limitation on law enforcement” by its suggestion
that because the GPS “is new, and vastly more efficient than
the investigative tools that preceded it,” it is “simply too good
to be used without a warrant.”105 The portable camera and
telephone were once considered new and highly efficient,
Smith‟s dissent noted, but “[t]he proposition that some devices
are too modern and sophisticated to be used freely in police
investigation[s] is not a defensible rule of constitutional law.”106
Criminals, Smith argued, will try to employ the most modern
and efficient tools available to them, and do not need a warrant
to do so.107 To limit police use of these same tools, Smith said,
“is to guarantee that the efficiency of law enforcement will
increase more slowly than the efficiency of law breakers.”108
Citing Kyllo v. United States,109 and United States v. Karo,110
which had held that law enforcement‟s use of technology to
monitor activities inside the home constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search, Smith‟s dissent suggested that, rather
than limiting the technology that investigators may use, the
court should limit the “places and things they may observe
with it.”111
The “hard”112 and “troubling”113 aspect of this case,
according to Smith, was not the use of the GPS device to track
the vehicle, but rather the surreptitious attachment of the GPS
to the defendant‟s car without his consent.114 He viewed the
attachment of the device as a trespass that, while not a
violation of the defendant‟s privacy rights, did violate the
defendant‟s property rights.115 Although a “fine distinction,”116
105. Id. at 1204-05 (Smith, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
109. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
110. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
111. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204-05 (Smith, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 1205 (Smith, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 1205 (Smith, J., dissenting) (“I do not care for the idea of a
police officer—or anyone else—sneaking under someone‟s car in the middle of
the night to attach a tracking device.”).
115. Id. at 1206 (Smith, J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
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Smith‟s dissent concluded that the existence of a property
interest “does not mean that [the] defendant also had a privacy
interest.”117 The device was attached to the outside of the car
while it was parked on a public street, and according to Smith,
“[n]o one who chooses to park in such a location can reasonably
think that the outside—even the underside—of the car is in a
place of privacy.”118 Citing Bond v. United States,119 in which
the Supreme Court held that an overly intrusive manipulation
of the exterior of a person‟s luggage constituted a Fourth
Amendment search, Smith‟s dissent argued that a search
would occur as a result of a trespass when information is
acquired that the property owner reasonably expected to keep
private.120
E. Dissenting Opinion by Judge Read
Judge Read wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which
Judge Graffeo joined.121 Although she found aspects of this
case to be “troubling,” particularly the length of time that the
GPS device was affixed to the defendant‟s car,122 Judge Read
found more troubling the manner in which the majority
“brushed aside” the state‟s constitutional jurisprudence, as well
as its “handcuffing” of the state legislature by
constitutionalizing a subject that should more properly be dealt
with legislatively rather than judicially.123 According to Read‟s
dissent, by “transmut[ing] GPS-assisted monitoring for
117. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (emphasis and internal citations
omitted). See also id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (“No authority, so far as I know,
holds that a trespass on private property, without more, is an unlawful
search when the property is in a public place.”).
118. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
119. 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (search of bus passenger‟s luggage).
120. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1206 (Smith, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 1206 (Read, J., dissenting).
122. Id. (Read, J., dissenting). Judge Read claimed that the U.S.
Supreme Court exempted from the definition of a search under the Fourth
Amendment the government‟s use of tracking devices “in lieu of or
supplemental to visual surveillance, so long as the tracking occurs outside
the home.” Id. at 1206-07 (Read, J., dissenting). However, it is unclear
whether and to what extent the Supreme Court has actually considered
“substitutes” to a law enforcement agent‟s visual tracking.
123. Id. (Read, J., dissenting).
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information that could have been easily gotten by traditional
physical surveillance into a constitutionally prohibited search,”
the majority impairs the Court‟s “institutional integrity” and
“denies New Yorkers the full benefit of the carefully wrought
balance between privacy and security interests that other
states have struck for their citizens through legislation.”124
Judge Read also discussed the dual methodology that has
been employed by the Court of Appeals when deciding whether
to apply the State Constitution rather than federal
constitutional law—an interpretive analysis and a noninterpretive analysis. An interpretive analysis is commonly
used, according to Judge Read, when there are textual
differences between a provision of the State Constitution and
its federal counterpart; but this is not a basis, in this case,
since the language of the Fourth Amendment and the State
Constitution‟s Article I, Section 12 is the same.125 Noninterpretative review, according to Read‟s dissent, “proceeds
from a judicial perception of sound policy, justice and
fundamental fairness.”126 To the extent that the majority
based its decision on a non-interpretative methodology, Read
claimed, the majority‟s analysis “has not come close to
justifying its holding as a matter of state constitutional law.”127
Indeed, according to Read‟s dissent, the majority‟s reliance on
the State Constitution is “standardless,”128 and renders the
State Constitution “a handy grab bag filled with a bevy of
clauses [to] be exploited in order to circumvent disfavored
United States Supreme Court decisions.”129
Read‟s dissent sought to justify the non-interpretative
basis for several search and seizure decisions in which the
Court of Appeals departed from the federal approach—cases
dealing with the protection of homes,130 private land,131 and the
124. Id. at 1212 (Read, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 1207-08 (Read, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 1208 (Read, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. P.J. Video, Inc.,
501 N.E.2d 556, 560 (N.Y. 1986)).
127. Id. (Read, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1210 (Read, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 1211 (Read, J., dissenting) (alteration in original and citation
omitted).
130. Id. at 1208 (Read, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Harris, 570
N.E.2d 1051 (N.Y. 1991); People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054 (N.Y. 1990)).
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interior of an automobile132—and argued that “there is no
discussion [by the majority in Weaver] of how the reasoning in
those cases . . . supports deviation from federal precedent in
this case.”133 Nor, according to the Read dissent, is the
majority‟s reliance on decisions from other state courts
interpreting their own state constitutions relevant to a noninterpretive analysis, which is explicitly linked to factors
peculiar to the State of New York.134 Moreover, Read added,
the majority failed to examine relevant New York statutory law
that regulates police surveillance and that appears to
contradict the majority‟s imposition of a warrant requirement
for GPS tracking.135
Finally, the Read dissent criticized the majority for
curtailing the state legislature‟s “liberty to act in the best
interests of the state‟s citizens as a whole.”136 Noting the
popularity and pervasive use of GPS by private citizens and
police, Read noted that many states have enacted
comprehensive legislation governing the use of GPS by police
for investigative purposes, as well as the procedures required
to use this technology.137 These statutes, Read said, typically
require a judicial warrant based on differing levels of factual
cause.138 To the extent that police surveillance implicates
competing values of privacy and security, Read‟s dissent
argued, it would be most appropriate for the state legislature to
balance these values and fashion a comprehensive regulatory
program similar to the statutes in other states, which could be
readily capable of amendment as the technology evolves.139
However, as Read argued, by constitutionalizing the GPS
131. Id. (Read, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328
(N.Y. 1992)).
132. Id. (Read, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61
(N.Y. 1989)).
133. Id. (Read, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
134. Id. at 1209 (Read, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 1210 (Read, J., dissenting) (New York state legislature “has
enacted elaborate statutory provisions to regulate police surveillance; in
particular, CPL articles 700 (eavesdropping and video surveillance warrants)
and 705 (pen registers and trap and trace devices)”).
136. Id. at 1212 (Read, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1211 (Read, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (Read, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1211-12 (Read, J., dissenting).
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monitoring technology, the majority has defined what the
legislature cannot do and has taken other regulatory
approaches “off the table.”140 And to the extent that different
judges will impose different temporal and other procedural
restrictions on the GPS warrant, she claimed, uniformity will
be compromised, and the utility of this investigative technique
will be significantly diminished.141
II. GPS Tracking as a Search
The decision by the New York Court of Appeals in Weaver,
that law enforcement‟s use of a GPS device to track a vehicle is
a search under the State Constitution that requires a warrant
for its use, has settled the issue as a matter of New York State
constitutional law. As a matter of federal constitutional law,
however, the issue has not been settled. Although the majority
opinion in the Appellate Division and the three dissenting
judges in the Court of Appeals contended that GPS tracking is
not a search under the federal constitution, the U.S. Supreme
Court has not considered whether such surveillance is a search
under the Fourth Amendment and only a handful of federal
appeals courts have examined the question.142 Nevertheless,
an examination of the Supreme Court‟s Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence generally, as well as its evolving approach to
Katz-expectation-of-privacy issues, strongly suggests that the
Supreme Court would consider the use by law enforcement of
GPS surveillance technology to be a search under the Fourth
Amendment.

140. Id. at 1212 (Read, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Read, J., dissenting).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007) (not
a search); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 1999) (same);
United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (same). But
see, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980) (search); United
States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v.
Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977) (same). The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia has recently heard oral argument on the
constitutionality of warrantless GPS tracking in United States v. Jones, No.
08-3034 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 2009). See, e.g., Brief of Appellants, Jones, No.
08-3034 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 17, 2009), 2009 WL 3155141. See Editorial, GPS and
Privacy Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2009, at A26 (discussing the appeal).
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A. Is Knotts Controlling?
The obvious analytical starting point is United States v.
Knotts,143 discussed by both the majority and dissenting
opinions in Weaver. In Knotts, law enforcement agents tracked
the progress of a vehicle by following the signals of a batteryoperated beeper that was placed in a five-gallon drum of
chloroform and that was transported by automobile to its
destination.144 This surveillance, the Supreme Court observed,
“amounted principally to the following of an automobile on
public streets and highways.”145
Thus, according to the
Supreme Court, the driver “voluntarily conveyed to anyone who
wanted to look the fact that he was traveling over particular
roads in a particular direction, the fact of whatever stops he
made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited from
public roads onto private property.”146 The Supreme Court
compared the risk that motorists assume when they travel on
public roads to the risk that telephone users take when they
“voluntarily convey” to the telephone company the numbers
they dial and therefore “assume the risk” that the telephone
company will reveal that information to the police.147
Moreover, the Supreme Court added, the fact that the agents
relied not only on their visual observations, but also on the
beeper to assist them in following the automobile, did not alter
the situation.148 Comparing the beeper to a searchlight, marine
glass, or field glass, the Supreme Court stated: “[n]othing in
the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting
the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such
enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this
143. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
144. Id. at 277.
145. Id. at 281. The Court added that automobiles enjoy a lesser
expectation of privacy than one‟s residence or as a repository of personal
effects. “A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels
public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its contents are in plain
view.” Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality)).
146. Id. at 281-82.
147. Id. at 283. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (the
installation of pen register onto a telephone in order to reveal the numbers
that were dialed did not intrude upon any reasonable expectation of privacy
of the phone user).
148. Id. at 282.
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case.”149 However, in a cautious response to the defendant‟s
argument that such a holding presaged the possibility of
“twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country,”150
the Supreme Court added: “if such dragnet type law
enforcement practices as respondent envisions should
eventually occur, there will be time enough then to determine
whether
different
constitutional
principles
may
be
applicable.”151
In Weaver, the majority acknowledged that “[a]t first
blush, it would appear that Knotts does not bode well for Mr.
Weaver.”152 Plainly, as the majority noted, the surveillance
technology in Knotts was used to track the progress of an
automobile over public roads and the operator‟s travel and
routes taken were exposed to “anyone who wanted to look.”153
However, the majority distinguished Knotts on three grounds,
all of which are potential arguments that almost certainly will
be raised in the Supreme Court if and when it considers
whether law enforcement‟s use of a GPS device is a search
under the Fourth Amendment: the powerful technology used,
the ability of this new technology to replace rather than
augment human sensory perception, and the massive intrusion
into privacy that the new technology facilitates.
B. New Surveillance Technology
First, the Weaver majority reasoned that the technology
used in Knotts was “a very primitive tracking device,” as
compared to the “vastly different and exponentially more
sophisticated and powerful [GPS] technology that is easily and
cheaply deployed and has virtually unlimited and remarkably
precise tracking capability.”154 The new technology is so
qualitatively and quantitatively different from the beeper in
Knotts, the majority observed, that its use by law enforcement
to intrude into privacy interests forces a court to apply the Katz
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 284.
People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1198 (N.Y. 2009).
Id. at 1198-99 (quoting Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281).
Id. at 1199.
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expectation-of-privacy doctrine to this new technological
frontier.155
The Weaver majority recognized that advances in visual
surveillance via satellite technology permits, easily and
cheaply, a massive, intrusive, and unlimited surveillance of
every citizen any time, any place, and regardless of
atmospheric conditions.156
The Weaver majority also
recognized that the introduction of this new technology
constitutes one of the greatest threats to privacy, and signals
the need to adjust the Fourth Amendment expectation-ofprivacy doctrine to this new phenomenon.157 Further, Weaver
recognized that Katz‟s Fourth Amendment expectation-ofprivacy approach offers insufficient protection to individuals
against indiscriminate use by government officials of modern
surveillance technology, and that the Court of Appeals should
not rely on the Supreme Court‟s restrictive interpretation of
the Fourth Amendment for the protection of individual
privacy.158
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not been impervious to
the “power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed
privacy,”159 and has recognized that Fourth Amendment search
and seizure doctrine must evolve to accommodate advances in
technology.160 Thus, in Dow Chemical Company v. United
States,161 the Supreme Court held that aerial photography of an
industrial plant by the Environmental Protection Agency using
a conventional commercial camera was not a search since
“[a]ny person with an airplane and an aerial camera could
readily duplicate them.”162
The Court added that the
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id. at 1198-99. See also United States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 34
(2001) (“The question we confront today is what limits there are upon [the]
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”).
158. See Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202.
159. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
160. See id. at 36 (“[T]he rule we adopt must take account of more
sophisticated systems that are already in use or in development.”).
161. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
162. Id. at 231. The Court noted that “a casual passenger on an airliner”
or “a company producing maps” could have taken the pictures. Id. at 232.
But see id. at 242 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(camera used by the agency cost in excess of $22,000 and was described as
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photography was not accomplished by using “sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public,
such as satellite technology, [which] might be constitutionally
proscribed absent a warrant,”163 nor were the photographs “so
revealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional
concerns.”164 Ultimately, however, the Court held that “[t]he
mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to
the degree here, does not give rise to constitutional
problems.”165
Moreover, Weaver‟s attempt to distinguish Knotts by
emphasizing that the police had used sophisticated GPS
technology to obtain information not visible to the naked eye
may find some support in Kyllo v. United States.166 In Kyllo,
the Supreme Court held that the government‟s use of a new
infrared technology—an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal
imager—to detect heat emanating from a person‟s home by
converting radiation into images based on relative warmth
constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment that
required a warrant.167 The Court observed that the technology
used by the government “is not in general public use,” and that
the device “explore[d] details of the home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion.”168
Acknowledging, as did the majority in Weaver, the potential of
vast and highly sophisticated satellite and radar technology to
“shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy,”169 the Court stated
that “we must take the long view, from the original meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.”170
C. GPS: Enhancement or Replacement
The second ground upon which the Weaver majority
“the finest precision aerial camera available”).
163. Id. at 238.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
167. Id. at 40.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 34.
170. Id. at 40.
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distinguished Knotts was to point out that the beeper in Knotts
“functioned merely as an enhancing adjunct to the surveilling
officers‟ senses,” and was used “as a means of maintaining and
regaining actual visual contact with it.”171 According to the
majority, the GPS, by contrast, is not a mere “enhancement of
human sensory capacity.”172 Rather, “it facilitates a new
technological perception of the world in which the situation of
any object may be followed and exhaustively recorded over, in
most cases, a practically unlimited period.”173
For law
enforcement agents to actually “see” what the GPS “sees,”
according to the Weaver majority, would require “at a
minimum, millions of additional police officers and cameras on
every street lamp.”174
The extent to which technology “enhances” the human
senses, as the beeper did in Knotts, and the camera did in Dow
Chemical, or “replaces” the human senses, as the thermal
imager did in Kyllo, is a relevant consideration in analyzing
whether surveillance technology constitutes a Fourth
Amendment search. According to Judge Smith‟s dissenting
opinion in Weaver, the GPS merely augmented information
that the police could have obtained anyway. “It is beyond any
question,” Judge Smith contended, that the police could have
obtained the “same information” that was obtained by using
the GPS by “assign[ing] an officer, or a team of officers, to
follow [Weaver] everywhere he went.”175 However, while
theoretically possible, Judge Smith‟s position is untenable as a
practical matter and unrealistic. It is inconceivable that, given
budgetary constraints on police work, finite time pressures for
different and competing investigations, and limited police
personnel, the police would have been able to “tail” Weaver
every hour of every day for sixty-five days to get the
information they used to convict him. Indeed, the use of a
beeper, as in Knotts, did not replace police surveillance but
merely enabled the police to maintain visual contact with an

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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already suspicious vehicle.176 It is therefore implausible to
think of the GPS as an “enhancement” of what could be seen
with the naked eye, just as it is implausible to construe the
thermal imager in Kyllo as an enhancement of what could be
seen by watching snow melt off a portion of the roof of a
house.177 Indeed, it would be equally implausible to think of
GPS as enhancing the surveillance that could have been
accomplished by a police officer hiding in the back seat of
Weaver‟s van for sixty-five days.
Moreover, to the extent that the Katz expectation-ofprivacy formulation, as it was applied in Knotts and other
cases, includes a reference to a person who “voluntarily
conveys” information to “anyone who wanted to look”—the
motorist traveling on public roads in Knotts,178 or the telephone
user dialing numbers in Smith v. Maryland179—it is completely
inapplicable to technology that replaces human sensory
perception. Indeed, most people probably would acknowledge
that one of the risks in modern society is exposure to
technology that augments that which is visible to the naked
eye—i.e., the beeper in Knotts, the camera in Dow Chemical, as
well as surveillance cameras in many public places. Moreover,
it is not unreasonable to suggest that people may be deemed to
have “voluntarily conveyed” to the outside world information
about their public activities that is visible to the outside world
by virtue of this “augmenting” technology. However, it is
unreasonable, even perverse, to suggest that persons have
“voluntarily conveyed” to sophisticated technology the capacity
to “see” them up close constantly, continuously, and for an
infinite period of time, to “record” detailed information as to
their movements through the world, to “transmit” to the
government all of the personal data that has been collected,
and to “retain” this information for an indefinite and unlimited
period of time.
176. See United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004)
(“Beepers placed on cars merely help the police stay in contact with the
vehicle that they are actively „tailing.‟”).
177. But see United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 997 (7th Cir. 2007)
(GPS technology not a “substitute” for activity of “following a car on a public
street”).
178. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
179. See 442 U.S. 735 (1970).
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By the same token, the inclusion in the Katz formulation of
the concept of “assumption of the risk” is also seriously out of
place in the context of technology that is used as a substitute
for the use of human senses. It may well be that when people
move about in public, or talk to other people, they assume a
risk that their actions will be seen and photographed, and their
words heard and recorded. Notwithstanding an abstract “right
to be let alone,” these are risks that the Fourth Amendment
imposes on privacy interests, and one of the most contentious
issues underlying the Katz expectation-of-privacy analysis.180
However, it is one thing to suggest that a person assumes a
risk that his words may be recorded by a listener, or his actions
photographed by an observer; it is a far more dubious and even
dangerous contention that privacy expectations under the
Fourth Amendment require citizens to assume the risk that
they will be “seen” constantly, continuously, and for an
unlimited period of time by government‟s omnipresent and
pervasive “Orwellian” surveillance technology, without any
judicial oversight or constitutional constraints.181
D. Degrees of Intrusions into Privacy
The third ground upon which the Weaver majority
distinguished Knotts was to contrast the limited and discrete
intrusion in Knotts with the unlimited and prolonged intrusion

180. See 1 WAYNE LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 313 (2d ed. 1987) (“[T]he fundamental inquiry is
whether [a government] practice, if not subjected to Fourth Amendment
restraints, would be intolerable because it would either encroach too much
upon the „sense of security‟ or impose unreasonable burdens upon those who
wished to maintain that security.”).
181. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1048-49 (Or. 1988).
Conversations in public may be overheard, but it is
relatively easy to avoid eavesdroppers by lowering the voice
or moving away. Moreover, one can be reasonably sure of
whether one will be overheard. But if the state‟s position in
this case is correct, no movement, no location and no
conversation in a „public place‟ would in any measure be
secure from the prying of the government.
Id.
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in Weaver. The beeper in Knotts, as the Weaver majority
observed, was used to enable the police to “tail” an automobile
during one single trip that involved “a focused binary police
investigation for the discreet purpose of ascertaining the
destination of a particular container of chloroform.”182 The
GPS device, according to the Weaver majority, involved a
“massive invasion of privacy”183 by exposing “the whole of a
person‟s progress through the world, into both public and
private spatial spheres, [which] can be charted and recorded
over lengthy periods.”184 As the majority observed, GPS could
reveal “trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the
abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip club, the
criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union
meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on
and on.”185
GPS can thereby reveal and record “with
breathtaking quality and quantity . . . a highly detailed profile,
not simply of where we go, but by easy inference, of our
associations—political, religious, amicable and amorous, to
name only a few—and of the pattern of our professional and
avocational pursuits.”186
The dissenting opinion of Judge Smith in the Court of
Appeals attempted to minimize the magnitude of the GPS
intrusion by adopting an “all-or-nothing” interpretation of
Knotts. That is, Judge Smith suggested, “an officer, or a team
of officers,” could have followed Weaver everywhere he went,
whether it involved trips to the psychiatrist‟s office or the gay
bar, and could have recorded, photographed, filmed, and
reported the “same information” that was obtained from the
GPS, as long as Weaver remained in public places.187
According to Judge Smith, once a person decides to expose his
identity and activities to the world by driving in a car on a
182. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009).
183. Id. at 1201.
184. Id. at 1199.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1199-1200. See State v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 223 (Wash.
2003) (en banc) (“In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast
number of places that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations,
personal ails and foibles. The GPS tracking devices record all of these
travels, and thus can provide a detailed picture of one‟s life.”).
187. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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public road—at any particular moment, as in Knotts—then he
or she has assumed the risk of exposing his or her identity and
activities continuously and indefinitely.188 But Judge Smith
did not acknowledge the practical and logistical difficulties that
law enforcement would face in trying to obtain the “same
information” by the visual and beeper surveillance used in
Knotts.
Further, Judge Smith did not acknowledge any
differences in terms of the quality and intensity of the
intrusion into privacy interests between the limited visual and
beeper surveillance in Knotts and the GPS surveillance in
Weaver.
Yet in distinguishing Knotts, this is precisely what the
Weaver majority recognized. One of the central themes of the
Supreme Court‟s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is, in fact,
the existence of different degrees of intrusions by government
into privacy interests, and the extent to which these different
degrees of intrusion require different levels of justification. For
example, in Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court recognized that,
while the government‟s interest in investigating reasonably
suspicious behavior authorized police to forcibly detain an
individual for a limited period of time, this temporary
detention did not justify the greater intrusion of a search of the
suspect.189 However, as the Supreme Court ruled, there does
exist a justification for a lesser intrusion—a “pat down” or
“frisk” of the suspect.190 The Supreme Court “emphatically
reject[ed]” the government‟s argument that a “frisk” of a
suspect was merely a “petty indignity” that did not rise to the
level of a search under the Fourth Amendment.191 Although a
frisk is not as intrusive as a full-blown search, a frisk “is a
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment.”192
The existence of degrees of intrusions into privacy—which
the Weaver majority recognized and which Judge Smith did
not—is also demonstrated by Camara v. Municipal Court of the
City and County of San Francisco, where the Supreme Court
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

See id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 25 (1968).
Id. at 24-25.
Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 17.
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recognized that an administrative inspection of a home for code
violations is not as intrusive as a search conducted pursuant to
a criminal investigation, and that therefore, although a
“significant intrusion,” such a search requires less
justification.193
Moreover, where intrusions into privacy
interests are “minimal,” such as being subjected to drug194 and
blood testing,195 the Supreme Court has authorized intrusions
into a person‟s body that require only minimal justification,
whereas more extensive intrusions into bodily privacy and
bodily integrity require greater justification.196
Furthermore, just as the Supreme Court has recognized
that government intrusions into privacy vary widely in terms of
nature and scope, and that judicial responses require different
levels of justification, so has the Supreme Court recognized the
existence of varying levels of expectations of privacy. Thus, the
Court has recognized different expectations of privacy with
respect to different places, such as homes,197 containers,198 and
vehicles.199 Moreover, although the Supreme Court in some
193. Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
194. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives‟ Ass‟n, 489 U.S. 602, 624
(1989) (“[P]rivacy interests implicated by the search are minimal.”).
195. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (intrusion not
significant since such tests “are a commonplace”).
196. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985) (surgery to
remove bullet).
197. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Fourth
Amendment draws „a firm line at the entrance to the house‟” (quoting Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980))); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961) (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion.”).
198. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (finding a
privacy interest in luggage because the luggage was not open to public view,
not subject to regular inspections and official scrutiny, and is intended as a
repository of personal effects). The Court has also recognized, however,
degrees on intrusions into the privacy of luggage. See United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (notwithstanding that a person possesses a privacy
interest in the contents of personal luggage, a “canine sniff” by a well-trained
narcotics detection dog “is much less intrusive than a typical search”).
199. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441-42 (1973) (finding a
diminished expectation of privacy for automobiles because of requirements
that automobiles be registered, periodically inspected, their operators be
licensed, the existence of regulations concerning the manner in which they
may be operated, and the occasional seizure of them in the interests of public
safety).
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contexts has taken an “all-or-nothing” approach to expectations
of privacy,200 it has also recognized that the reasonableness of
expectations of privacy may vary depending on the nature and
extent of the government‟s intrusion. Thus, in Bond v. United
States, the Supreme Court held that the exploratory
manipulation of the outside of a bus passenger‟s canvas bag by
a narcotics agent was an excessive intrusion into the
passenger‟s reasonable expectation of privacy in his bag.201
Although a bus passenger “clearly expects that his bag may be
handled. . . [h]e does not expect that other passengers or bus
employees will, as a matter of course, feel the bag in an
exploratory manner.”202 Similarly, in Dow Chemical, the
Supreme Court held that, while aerial photographs of an
industrial plant did not intrude into a legitimate expectation of
privacy since a casual passenger in an airplane could have
taken the same photographs, surveillance of private property
by using “highly sophisticated” satellite technology that could
reveal “intimate details” might be such an excessive intrusion
as to implicate constitutional concerns.203 Further, the Court
has recognized that even though a person possesses a privacy
interest in the contents of personal luggage,204 a “canine sniff”
of that luggage by a well-trained narcotics detection dog is not
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.205 The
sniff, according to the Court in United States v. Place, while an
intrusion, does not expose non-contraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden, and discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics.206 “[T]his investigative technique,” said
the Court, “is much less intrusive than a typical search.”207
Finally, in Mancusi v. DeForte, the Supreme Court recognized
a difference in the reasonableness of the expectation of privacy
depending on the identity of the intruder.208 In Mancusi, the
200. See Doernberg, supra note 21, at 295 (describing the Supreme
Court‟s “muddled view of privacy as an all-or-nothing concept”).
201. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000).
202. Id.
203. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238 (1986).
204. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977).
205. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
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Court held that a union official had no reasonable expectation
of privacy with respect to his union superiors, but that he did
have a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the
government.209
These cases all recognize that there can be a legally
significant difference in terms of the degree, scope, and
duration of an intrusion into privacy.210 That difference is
particularly stark between the visual and beeper surveillance
used in Knotts, and the GPS surveillance used in Weaver.
Being watched by the government on one discrete occasion, as
in Knotts, and being watched constantly and continuously for
sixty-five days, as in Weaver, are so different as to require
different constitutional responses. Moreover, there is some
empirical evidence to suggest that society recognizes the
difference between the two.211 In addition, Congress has
enacted legislation requiring a judicial warrant for electronic
tracking devices.212 This evidence suggests that most people do
not expect that the government will be watching their every
movement and the locations of their travel routes and
destinations for an extended period of time. This kind of
“dragnet” intrusion into privacy conjures up Orwellian images
of “mass surveillance” of motorists picked at random by the
209. Id. at 369.
210. The Court has also recognized that intrusions into possessory
interests can vary in their intensity. See Place, 462 U.S. at 705 (“The
intrusion on possessory interests occasioned by a seizure of one‟s personal
effects can vary both in its nature and extent.”). As to whether the
attachment of the GPS device constitutes a seizure, see infra Part III.
211. See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of
Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213 (2002) (according
to a survey, the intrusiveness of police using camera surveillance of a public
street where the tapes are retained is of far greater concern than where tapes
are destroyed). See also Ben Hubbard, Police Turn to Secret Weapon: GPS
Device,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM,
Aug.
13,
2008,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/08/12/AR2008081203275.html (follow “Poll”) (stating
that sixty percent of 3,008 responders believed that the “growing use of GPS
technology by police departments to track criminal suspects marks [a]
troubling trend”).
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 3117(a) (2006) (authorizing courts to issue warrants
for installation of mobile tracking devices). But see United States v.
Gbemisola, 225 F.3d 753, 758 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding that Congress
understood that “warrants are not always required for either the installation
or use of mobile tracking devices”).
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government, and using digital search techniques to identify
suspicious patterns of behavior.213 Whether such a massive
surveillance program constitutes a Fourth Amendment search
that requires a warrant, or instead is merely an “efficient
alternative to hiring another [ten] million police officers to tail
every vehicle on the nation‟s roads”214 is a federal question that
the Supreme Court one day may answer; but, as a result of
People v. Weaver, it is a question that has been definitively and
conclusively answered by the New York State Court of Appeals
under the State Constitution.
Finally, given the profound effect of technology to increase
the ability of law enforcement to scrutinize any given
individual, or many of them,215 the “ultimate question” posed
by Professor Anthony Amsterdam is “whether, if [a] particular
form of surveillance practiced by the police is permitted to go
unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy
and freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open
society.”216 It is hardly an answer, as Judge Smith argues in
his dissent, to claim that since criminals will use the most
modern and efficient tools available to them, and will not get
warrants to do so, the courts should not impose restraints on
the ability of the police to employ the same technology to catch
them.217 Contrary to this hyperbole, however, there is no
213. See United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007).
One can imagine the police affixing GPS tracking devices to
thousands of cars at random, recovering the devices, and
using digital search techniques to identify suspicious
driving patterns. One can even imagine a law requiring all
new cars to come equipped with the device so that the
government can keep track of all vehicular movement in the
United States.
Id.
214. Id.
215. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33-34 (2001) (“It would be
foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”).
216. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 403 (1974).
217. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1204 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
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suggestion in Weaver that police may not use technology to
solve crime. The majority simply requires that the police
obtain a warrant to do so, which police have been required to
do for centuries.
III. GPS Tracking as a Seizure
The Supreme Court has declared that a government
“seizure” of property occurs “when there is some meaningful
interference with an individual‟s possessory interests in that
property.”218
Under the Supreme Court‟s definition, the
attachment of the GPS should constitute a “meaningful
interference” with the owner‟s right to use his property
exclusively for his own purpose and to exclude everyone else
from his property, including the government.219 Whether the
attachment of the beeper in Knotts, or that of the GPS in
Weaver, “meaningfully interferes” with an individual‟s
possessory interest in that property is an open question under
both the federal and New York State constitutions. Neither the
Supreme Court in Knotts, nor the Court of Appeals in Weaver,
addressed that question.220
Interestingly, the Massachusetts Supreme Court recently
decided the question. In Commonwealth v. Connolly, the court
found that police had seized the defendant‟s vehicle by entering
his van for one hour to install a GPS device, and by operating
the van‟s electrical system in order to attach the device to the
218. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). See United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983) (“In the ordinary case, the Court has
viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a
judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the
items to be seized.”).
219. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 729 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
220. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (“I think this would have been a much more difficult case if
respondent had challenged, not merely certain aspects of the monitoring of
the beeper installed in the chloroform container purchased by respondent‟s
compatriot, but also its original installation.”); Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1204
(Smith, J., dissenting) (“[S]urreptitious attachment of the device to the car . .
. goes virtually unmentioned.”). The Court in Knotts noted that several
Courts of Appeals approved the warrantless installations of beepers. 460
U.S. at 279 n. (unnumbered footnote).
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vehicle‟s power source and verify that it was operating
properly.221 The court stated that the operation of the GPS,
which had required power from the defendant‟s vehicle, was
“an ongoing physical intrusion.”222 The court also found that a
seizure occurred regardless of whether the GPS draws power
from the vehicle.223 “It is a seizure,” the court declared, “not by
virtue of the technology employed, but because the police use
private property (the vehicle) to obtain information for their
own purposes.”224 The continual monitoring by the police
transformed the vehicle into a “messenger” for the
government,225 as well as “substantially infring[ing] on another
meaningful possessory interest in the minivan: the defendant‟s
use and enjoyment of his vehicle.”226
In his dissent in Weaver, Judge Smith explicitly addressed
this “hard” question—whether the installation of the GPS
constituted a seizure.227 Although he was “troubled” by what
he considered a “trespass” that violated the defendant‟s
property rights,228 he concluded, “with some hesitation,” that
the trespass did not violate the defendant‟s right to be free
from unreasonable searches.229 Judge Richard Posner reached
a similar conclusion in United States v. Garcia.230 Judge
Posner held that it is “untenable” to claim that the
government‟s attachment of a GPS device underneath the
defendant‟s vehicle constituted a Fourth Amendment
seizure.231 The GPS device, he noted, “did not affect the car‟s
driving qualities, did not draw power from the car‟s engine or
battery, did not take up [any] room that might . . . have been
occupied by passengers or packages, [and] did not . . . alter the

221. Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369 (Mass. 2009).
222. Id.
223. Id. at 370.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1205 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
228. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
229. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
230. 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007).
231. Id. at 996.
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car‟s appearance.”232 In short, he said, the attachment “did not
„seize‟ the car in any intelligible sense of the word.”233
However, there is an alternative interpretation of a seizure
that follows the reasoning of Justice Stevens in his concurring
and dissenting opinion in United States v. Karo.234 According
to Justice Stevens, by attaching an electronic monitoring device
to a car, the government asserted “dominion and control” over
the car,235 and “in a fundamental sense . . . converted the
property to its own use,” thereby depriving the owner of the
right to use his property exclusively.236 Such interference is
also “meaningful,” according to Justice Stevens, because “the
character of the property is profoundly different when infected
with an electronic bug than when it is entirely germ free.”237
Lending support to Justice Stevens‟s view of the meaning
of a seizure is Silverman v. United States.238 In Silverman, the
Supreme Court held that the attachment of a listening device
to the heating duct of an apartment building in order to
overhear conversations “usurp[ed]” the owner‟s property rights
without his knowledge or consent.239 The Court refused to
consider whether such intrusion into a person‟s tangible
property interests may have constituted a “technical trespass”
under “ancient niceties of tort or real property law,”240 because
it clearly implicated the Fourth Amendment right of a person
to exclusive and exclusionary use of his or her property.241
In his dissenting opinion in Weaver, Judge Smith
attempted to draw a “fine distinction” between property rights
and privacy rights.242 Judge Smith acknowledged that the

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
235. Id. at 730 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“„[A]ssert[ing] dominion and control‟ is a „seizure‟ in the most basic sense of
the term.” (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 (1984))).
236. Id. at 729 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
237. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
238. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
239. Id. at 511.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1206 (N.Y. 2009) (Smith, J.,
dissenting).
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police did trespass onto the defendant‟s property and thereby
violated his property rights.243 However, according to Judge
Smith, the attachment of the GPS device “did not invade his
privacy.”244 As Judge Smith elaborated, Weaver‟s car was
parked on a public street and “[n]o one who chooses to park in
such a location can reasonably think that the outside—even the
underside—of the car is in a place of privacy.”245 While Judge
Smith acknowledged that a person may reasonably expect that
others will leave his car alone and not tamper with it by
sneaking underneath of it and installing electronic devices,
that is not an expectation of privacy, but “an expectation of
respect for one‟s property rights.”246 The distinction between a
defendant‟s “property” interest and his “privacy” interest,
Judge Smith observed, although a “fine distinction,” is
nevertheless a “critical” distinction.247 A trespass to private
property is not a search when that private property is located
in a public place, Judge Smith argued, unless information is
acquired that the property owner reasonably expected to keep
private.248 Thus, although disapproving “the idea of a police
officer—or anyone else—sneaking under someone‟s car in the
middle of the night to attach a tracking device,”249 Judge Smith
concluded that however “distasteful,”250 a court should not, in
effect, expand privacy rights beyond those guaranteed by the
state and federal constitutions.
IV. Conclusion
The Katz expectation-of-privacy test requires a person who
claims the protection of the Fourth Amendment to demonstrate
both a subjective expectation of privacy and an expectation of
privacy that society considers reasonable. However, as this
243. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
244. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
245. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
246. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
247. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
248. Id. (Smith, J., dissenting). Judge Smith cited Bond v. United
States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) where the Court suppressed drugs discovered by a
narcotics agent by manipulating the outer portion of the defendant‟s luggage.
249. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1205 (Smith, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 1206 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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Article has shown, the Katz test may be inadequate with
respect to intrusions into privacy interests that involve highly
sophisticated surveillance technology. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that the protections of the Fourth Amendment
must evolve with the advances of science and technology. The
question presented to the New York Court of Appeals in People
v. Weaver was whether the federal or state constitution offered
protection to a defendant where law enforcement officials had
attached a GPS device to his vehicle and monitored his travels
every hour of every day for sixty-five days, and used
information from the surveillance to convict him of a burglary.
Given the fact that the Supreme Court had not addressed
this issue, and that a related precedent in the Supreme Court,
United States v. Knotts, involved the use by law enforcement of
a much less sophisticated tracking device, the Court of Appeals
chose not to analyze the case under the Federal Constitution
and distinguish Knotts, but rather to apply the State
Constitution. The Court of Appeals found that under the State
Constitution, the attachment of the GPS and the prolonged
surveillance was a search.
As the Court of Appeals
persuasively demonstrated, the degree and magnitude of GPS
surveillance involves such a massive invasion of privacy that a
judicial warrant is required for its use. Moreover, although the
Court of Appeals did not address the issue, there are
respectable arguments that the government‟s surreptitious
installation of a GPS device to a vehicle constitutes a seizure
because such conduct interferes with a person‟s property
interests in a sufficiently meaningful way.

